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WHAT IS PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING?
T.he performance contract-turnkey approach to school system
reform is a managerial concept designed to encourage re-
sponsible innovation while holding those in charge accountable
for results. Typically, a school district enters into a contract with
an outside firm or a teachers' group or faculty to accelerate the
skill development of a limited number of educationally deficient
students, usually in such areas as math and reading. Reimburse-
ment to the contractor is based on the actual performance of
the students as measured by standardized achievement or cri-
•terion referenced and performance based tests. After a period of
successful demonstration, the school adopts or expands the con-
tractor's program in its regular classrooms on a turnkey basis,
making the necessary changes in order to realize the full po-
tential of the program.
The meaning of "turnkey" is based on its use in the public
housing field, where authorities contract with private firms to
build houses. When the houses are completed and certified,
the firms "turn the keys over" to the authorities, who in turn
present them to the recipients. As applied in education, turnkey
refers to the turning over of the instructional program and learn-
ing systems designed, packaged, and successfully demonstrated
by the performance contractor to the school system. The con-
trading firm steps out of the picture, and the school continues
the program with its own staff and management.
A school district could decide to initiate a performance con-
tract-turnkey project because it seeks one or all of the following:
A supplemental capability in a program or curriculum area that
does not now exist or would be too costly to develop internally
(for example, vocational training in a specific skill to meet a short-
run industry employment demand)
A vehicle for testing, analyzing, and validating newly de-
veloped and unproven instructional systems sold by firms to de-
termine whether or not to adopt or expand it on a large-scale
or system-wide basis
A feasible solution to political, social, and economic problems
confronting school administrators, board members, or community
leaders.
The heart of the approach to the planning of a performance
contract-turnkey project is the Request for Proposal (RFP) sent
to prospective bidders or local teachers' groups. This document
includes not only the educational performance specifications de-
sired, usually in grade level equivalents or mastery levels on
criterion referenced tests, but also such provisions as the number
of dollars to be budgeted per student and the amount of the
student's time which will be available to the contractor. The final
provisions are based upon the RFP, the contractors response,
and face-to-face negotiations.
After the project has been in operation for seven to nine
months, a turnkey analysis is conducted, usually by an indepen-
dent Management Support Group (MSG), to determine:
The relative cost effectiveness (usually in dollars per unit of
achievement) of the contractor's program in math and reading
as compared to the school's existing program in similar areas
with similar students
The economics of the contractor s instructional program for
planning the nature and extent of the turnkey phase the second
year (for example, cost trade offs that allow an increase of in-
structional materials by 75 percent if the class size is increased
by one student)
The nature, extent, and costs of management changes that
have to be initiated by the school to achieve the benefits that
the contractor has demonstrated can be achieved.
For example, the contractor can guarantee that the school
will achieve 90 percent of the demonstrated effectiveness by
utilizing differentiated staffing, incentive pay, and individualized,
self-paced materials in the turnkey classes. A lesser guarantee is
offered if the school decides to adopt the learning system using
only some of the recommendations. The school administrator is
thereby able to consider alternative levels of costs and benefits
in deciding the extent of the turnkey phase, and can present
them to the school board with leverage. Hence, the performance
contract-turnkey approach should not be viewed as an end in
itself. Rather, it provides a means by which the local school
system can experiment effectively, test a new instructional pro-
gram, and adopt the new program, making changes within the
system to ensure that the potential results can be realized.
Most school board members and laymen find it difficult to
decide on such matters as pedagogy and methodology, but the
concept of tying costs to guaranteed or minimum results is easily
understood when common sense and quality control measures
are incorporated. Since most board members have their own
political constituency, it becomes relatively easy to gather sup-
port for a concept that can be easily communicated. Performance
contracting also enables the school board to make policy deci-
sions while delegating the program decisions to the contractor
or the administrative staff.
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HOW IT ALL STARTED
ritics with a bent for history say that performance contract-
ing is not new. "Pay for results" in England during the late
1800's created such intense teacher anxieties, that officials were
forced to strip the "inspector" of his authority to test and deter-
mine payment due. In Canada several decades later, the plan
was terminated because of the large number of teachers who
were caught "teaching to the tests." More recent critics have
attributed performance contracting to a "conspiracy among the
author, former Associate Commissioner Lean Lessinger, and the
White House to have private industry take over public education.
In reality, the foundation for performance contracting as ap-
plied recently in education evolved from a study conducted in
1964-65 by the author while a graduate student at the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and a consultant to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In 1964, the President
established a Committee to Report on the Economic Impact of
Defense and Disarmament. One of its subcommittees analyzed
the problems and potential of defense industry diversification
into areas such as transportation, housing, and education.
The subcommittee's report recommended as early as April,
1964, that management techniques—including performance con-
trading and, to a lesser extent, hardware systems technology—
should be applied to solving some of our urban problems. The
major conclusion of the study was that defense and technology
oriented firms could diversify and apply techniques and tech-
nologies in the public service area; however, local governments,
including school systems were not managed and organized in a
way that enabled them to utilize these breakthroughs effectively.
In short, the market did not exist.
Yet big business could see big money in the field of educa-
tion. Misled by a simplistic report written by a staff of account-
ants, a large number of combines and joint ventures were formed
in 1964-65 among electronics based firms, and education pub-
lishers, and software manufacturers, for example, SRA, D. C.
Heath, and RCA-Random House. Moreover, during the same
period the U.S. Office of Education expanded its developmental
efforts in such areas as computer assisted instruction, the develop-
ment of multimedia systems, and other technological develop-
ments. The large combines utilizing private as well as public
funds designed and developed costly learning systems; however,
few attempts were made to develop the management capability
of local school systems to purchase and implement such learn-
ing techniques. The great irony in our society once again surfaced:
adept in developing science and technology, we were unable, if
not unwilling, to design and develop the political and manager-
ial innovations needed to apply such technology effectively, there-
by, realizing its fullest potential while minimizing its adverse
implications.
The upshot was that private industry paid the price of learn-
ing the hard way. School systems did not have the incentive to
purchase cost effective learning systems; their procurement
practices favored piecemeal purchases over the total package,
and their traditions and regulations had to be modified radically
to not only demonstrate such learning systems and pilot pro-
grams, but, more important, to expand and apply them once
proven successful (see Phi Delta Kappan, January, 1967). So in-
dustry began to retrench, and federal funds for technology
dried up. In 1967, many school officials and teachers, recalling
the 1959-61 teaching machine-programmed learning fiasco, once
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again had their heyday; others were beginning to realize their
deficiencies in school management and organization.
In this atmosphere of growing awareness, performance con-
trading emerged conceptually as the vehicle and managerial
innovation that would free industry to design and implement a
learning system tailored to meet the needs of the target popula-
tion to be served in the most cost effective manner. At the same
time, it was thought that a successful demonstration program
would modify school regulations and customs so that new man-
agement and technological approaches might be adopted (see
Education Technology, June, 1968).
The Cainesville Proposal
Performance contracting was attempted first in Gainesville,
Ga., in a Concentrated Employment Program (CEP). One of the
program's components was vocational training for recent high
school dropouts. Contracting firms working with Gainesville em-
players were to institute a combined formal and on-the-job train-
ing program for 200-300 youths. Incentives would be provided
for both the contractor and the employer" to ensure that the
trainee completed the course at a certain proficiency level in
the least amount of time for the least cost. Even though the
proposed program would guarantee results and cost approxi-
mately 30 percent of traditional programs, it became evident
that federal, regional, and state officials would not support the
program because of its implications and its radical break with
tradition.
A second component of the program proposed to improve the
achievement of adults in basic education and to accelerate
achievement for potential dropouts in the Gainesville schools.
The major hurdle in applying the concept was the number of
rules and regulations that would have been violated—class size,
payment based on the number of hours attended rather than
achievement levels performed, and so on. The controversial na-
ture of the proposal prompted the Manpower Administrators Of-
fice to state that CEP dollars "cannot be used to prevent students
from dropping out of school; rather, they can be used only if and
n
when the student actually drops out." Largely because of the
performance contracting controversy, as well as political contro-
versy surrounding the CEP, the young and imaginative director
resigned and his successor was ordered to "clean it up or close
it down.
Even though the attempt was aborted, three facts became ap-
parent to those involved in developing the program. First, the
concept could be supported by high-level, politically responsible
officials (in this case. White House staff members and HEW of-
ficials), but at the same time opposed strongly by the bureau-
cracy. Second, while only a small number of firms were con-
tacted as potential contractors, considerable interest was gen-
erated providing program managers with the opportunity and
necessary ammunition to begin selling the concept to hesitant
corporate officials. And last, as a corollary, it was clear that the
concept would have to be sold on this basis of social, economic,
and political criteria as well as educative merit.
The Texarkana Project
On Dec. 7, 1968, the author met in Texarkana, Ark., with the
district's three school superintendents to discuss the possibility
of performance contracting in this rather desolate city on the
Texas-Arkansas border. After forty-five minutes of probing, it
was concluded that the three districts would apply jointly for a
planning grant under the new "dropout or prevention" amend-
merits, Title VIII, Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The
major purpose of the project would be to use performance con-
trading to discourage students from dropping out. However, it
became apparent that the superintendents and their staff felt
that the concept had other merit, including a means to defeat
"freedom of choice" and to assist school desegregation; an al-
ternative to teacher pay based on tenure; an opportunity to in-
crease community involvement with school activities; and a
means to experiment at little or no risk.
The climate for innovation in Texarkana appeared favorable.
First, the dropout rates in all three school districts were officially
reported relatively high although understated for political reasons.
(The actual dropout rates were about 15 percent.) Second, all
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three school districts were under community pressure or court
orders to desegregate. The Texarkana, Ark., district's plans to
desegregate the senior high school in September, 1969, had been
accepted by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
The black students to be integrated into the previously all-white
high school were approximately 70 percentiles below their white
counterparts in math and reading.
Third, all three school boards favored desegregation to vary-
ing degrees, even though Texarkana was the home town of Free-
dom. Inc., the national advocate of "freedom of choice." Most of
the members felt that a performance contract which guaranteed to
accelerate the achievement of students, most of them members
of a minority group, would ease the integration process by bring-
ing the students to a level where they could compete with their
peers. They also felt that information about the project could be
conveyed to minority parents through the Model Cities Demon-
stration Agency and the Model City neighborhood councils,
thereby allaying the fear that their children would not be able to
compete after integration and would drop out. Board members
felt that the program's success would guarantee their reelection
in the spring.
Fourth, many of the school board members felt that perform-
ance contracting offered a low risk opportunity to experiment
with radically innovative programs, which could in fact improve
the performance of many disadvantaged children, a rising and
genuine concern. The risk was low in several respects. If the
contractor failed, the schools could hire another, and the pro-
gram would not have cost the school district much since pay-
ment was based upon results. If the program succeeded, the
school could adopt the contractor's program on a turnkey basis,
expanding it to benefit all underachieving students. Finally, sev-
eral board members, including local and state politicians, felt
that existing teacher certification, class size, and other state and
local regulations which created inefficiency could be revealed as
the obstacles they were.
Passively supported by the State Department of Education,
the project was chosen as one of twenty to be awarded an initial
planning grant. Superintendent Edward Trice, designated as a
fiscal agent for the three districts, was notified of the selection
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in February, 1969, and the project was critically reviewed by
the U.S. Office of Education Review Panel, outside consultants.
Most objections were based on ideological rather than technical
grounds; this was to be expected since the majority of the panel
members represented the educational establishment and, through
various connections, were associated with threatened vested in-
terest groups. The project probably would not have been funded
had it not been for "encouragement" from both Associate Com-
missioner Lean Lessinger and Arkansas and Texas congress-
men and high-level state officials. The final proposal was sub-
mitted to the Office of Education in May, 1969. Meanwhile, other
political obstacles were being created in Texarkana. Freedom-of-
choice advocates running for school board positions promised to
withdraw the previously approved desegregation plans, leaving
the school district out of compliance and thus unable to par-
ticipate in the project. A public referendum was held in Tex-
arkana in May, and 71 percent voted against freedom of choice!
In June, the project was approved; however, only two of the
three districts were allowed to participate. The Texarkana In-
dependent School District was placed in a "deferred status" be-
cause of some questions regarding its desegregation plans. In a
tersely worded letter to Secretary Robert Finch, Senator Wright
Patman stated that "this action is contrary to our entire gov-
ernmental process . . . that the project was designed to assist in
eliminating the problem in contention, and that ... in short,
Mr. Secretary, you are cutting off your nose to spite your face.
Even though the Texas independent desegregation plan was
eventually accepted, HEW refused to allow the district to par-
ticipate.
The prebidders' conference in June was attended by repre-
sentatives from more than forty firms and by various local and
state political figures. Ten firms submitted proposals, and five
were asked to make presentations. It became apparent from the
proposals and the briefings that most of the firms had attempted
to utilize proven techniques, such as hiring local athletic heros
as project personnel; proposing to hire educators known and ac-
ceptable to board members; entering into agreements and sub-
contracts with local universities; and conducting private "dis-
cussions with community leaders. In the end, the evaluation
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committee and board members reviewed the bottom line—the
cost per grade level increase guarantees of the respective bid-
ders—and made their choice.
In September, 1969, Dorsett Education Systems, which guar-
anteed a grade level increase for $80 per pupil, was selected.
The draft officially submitted to the Office of Education in
October included prohibitions on "teaching to the test , since
Dorsett had demonstrated that the incorporation of word mean-
ings in a limited number of vocabulary test items could guarantee
well over a grade level increase. The draft provided that:
At least two tests would be selected with alternative forms
used for protests and posttests
In addition to the regular vocabulary test used to determine
student level, differential vocabulary testing developed in con-
junction with the local teachers and, if possible, Arkansas or
Texas state testing specialists would be used, with the weight
given to this test to be determined by the contractor
The contractor would have the option of retesting the enrollees
at any time up to six months after leaving the instructional pro-
gram in order to compare their retention to that of normal
achievers in the local area. The comparison .could be the basis
for adjustment of payments to the contractor'or for a reimburse-
ment to the fiscal agent based on renegotiations.
These provisions, directed at preventing the contractor from
teaching the test, were deleted or radically modified by the
Office of Education.
The preliminary favorable results of the program (for example,
gains over one grade level) were dampened by a letter from
HEW in February, 1970, to the Texarkana, Ark., School District.
The district was ordered to desegregate its elementary and junior
high schools immediately, rather than in September, 1970, or
face termination of the project. All efforts to communicate the
success of the program (based on preliminary results, commun-
ity acceptance, and reduction of dropout rates) fell on deaf ears
in the Office of Civil Rights Compliance at HEW. In desperation,
a letter was sent to the Vice-President. The letter highlighted
the preliminary results and noted that one branch of HEW was
apparently disregarding a promising integration approach that
was being supported by another branch within the department.
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A few days later, Texarkana was notified that they would be
allowed to wait until September to desegregate the elementary
and junior high schools; the HEW Chief of Civil Rights Compli-
ance "resigned" shortly thereafter.
The project's troubles were still not over. In May, a student
being posttested noticed an item that had been included in his
curriculum. Upon further analysis, other repeated items were
found in frames presented to the students in April and May. The
Magnolia Service Center, a Title 111-sponsored regional technical
assistance group hired to monitor and evaluate the project, at-
tempted to determine the extent of teaching to the test.
Unable to satisfy Office of Education and local officials re-
garding the extent of the violation. Magnolia asked Education
Testing Service to determine the validity of the allegations. ETS
officials, strong critics of performance contracting, concluded
that a large number of test items did appear in the curriculum,
making "the results invalid." The education auditor (like Mag-
nolia selected four or five months after the project was initiated
and therefore unaware of much of its background) certified the
evaluator's report. The school board members and staff, however,
expressed contrary opinions, since the project had reduced the
dropout rate significantly, lowered vandalism, involved parents,
and motivated a large number of failing students. The program
was continued the second year with another firm.
Many have asked why the contractor did teach to the test to
the extent that he did. Some have argued that he followed the
letter of the "revised" contract precisely rather than the intent,
since teaching to the test provisions had been removed. Others
have argued that rather lax quality control over the develop-
ment of materials provided the opportunity for an anxious
programmer to put test items in the audio-visual frames. Still
others have surmised that certain programming staff members,
given two weeks notice because they were about to form their
own company, deliberately put forbidden items into the cur-
riculum.
A more fundamental question is whether or not the alleged
teaching of test items was significant enough to affect student
achievement. For example, forty of the 106 students who took
the "contaminated" May test also took "pure" March and April
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tests. Of the forty, twenty-one showed a slight gain and nineteen
a slight loss between the March and April tests, and the May
testing. In addition, a recent project for young school dropouts
(using a modified Dorset! system) indicated that these dropouts
showed a 1.7 grade level gain in reading and 1.4 grade level gain
in math in approximately sixty hours of instruction in both sub-
jects. The results, which were alleged to be invalid during the
Dropout Prevention Project, indicated that the students had
achieved approximately 1.5 grade level gains in reading and
slightly less in math in approximately eighty hours.
The Texarkana experience, in retrospect, was healthy. First,
it highlighted the inadequacies of standardized tests as an in-
strument for determining payment and generated the demand
for performance based and criterion referenced testing systems.
Second, the complexities in designing and implementing a con-
tract project became generally appreciated. Third, it legitima-
tized several new roles: the Management Support Group as an
unofficial communication linkage, management broker, and pro-
vider of technical assistance; the education program auditor as
the certifier of implementation procedures and results attained;
and the school board as the body decides policy issues which
the administrative staff implements. And last, it proved that a
performance contract project could be implemented despite for-
midable political and bureaucratic hurdles.
1970-71: THE YEAR OF EXPANSION
erformance contracting began to expand during the summer
and fall of 1970 (see Table 1). The Dallas Independent School
District unveiled its large and complex project for senior high
students in math, reading, vocational training, and achievement
motivation. The major objective of this five-year performance
contract-turnkey project was to determine the cost effectiveness
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P e r f o r m a n c e  C o n t r a c t i n g  E x p a n s i o n  i n  1 9 7 0 - 7 1
. /
A n c h o r a g e ,  A l a s k a
D a l l a s ,  T e x a s
R o c k l a n d .  M e .
A t h e n s ,  G a .
S e l m e r .  T e n n .
W i c h i t a ,  K a n .
B r o n x ,  N . Y .
H a m m o n d .  I n d .
J a c k s o n v i l l e .  F l a .
F r e s n o ,  C a l i f .
L a s V e g a s ,  N e v .
P h i l a d e l p h i a ,  P a .
G r a n d  R a p i d s ,  M i c h .
H a r t f o r d .  C o n n .
T a f t ,  T e x a s
M c C o m b ,  M i s s .
P o r t l a n d ,  M e .
S e a t t l e ,  W a s h .
S t o c k t o n ,  C a l i f .
/
Q u a l i t y  E d u c a t i o n  D e v e l o p m e n t
Q u a l i t y  E d u c a t i o n  D e v e l o p m e n t
Q u a l i t y  E d u c a t i o n  D e v e l o p m e n t
P l a n  E d u c a t i o n  C e n t e r s
P l a n  E d u c a t i o n  C e n t e r s
P l a n  E d u c a t i o n  C e n t e r s
L e a r n i n g  F o u n d a t i o n s
L e a r n i n g  F o u n d a t i o n s
L e a r n i n g  F o u n d a t i o n s
W e s t i n g h o u s e  L e a r n i n g  C o r p .
W e s t i n g h o u s e  L e a r n i n g  C o r p .
W e s t i n g h o u s e  L e a r n i n g  C o r p .
A l p h a  L e a r n i n g  S y s t e m s
A l p h a  L e a r n i n g  S y s t e m s
A l p h a  L e a r n i n g  S y s t e m s
S i n g e r / G r a f l e x
S i n g e r / G r a f l e x
S i n g e r / G r a f l e x
C l a s s r o o m  T e a c h e r s  A s s o c .
/
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
/ /
^ '  < ^
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
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6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
6 0 0
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
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1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
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1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
1 - 3 ,  7 - 9
^
^ '
$ 4 4 4 , 6 3 2
$ 2 9 9 , 4 1 7
$ 2 9 9 , 2 1 1
$ 3 0 1 , 7 7 0
$ 2 8 6 , 9 9 1
$ 2 9 4 , 7 0 0
$ 3 4 1 , 7 9 6
$ 3 4 2 , 5 2 8
$ 3 4 2 , 3 0 0
$ 2 9 9 , 0 1 5
$ 2 9 8 , 7 4 4
$ 2 9 6 , 2 9 1
$ 3 2 2 , 4 6 4
$ 3 2 0 , 5 7 3
$ 2 4 3 , 7 5 1
$ 2 6 3 , 0 8 5
$ 3 0 8 , 1 8 4
$ 3 4 3 , 8 0 0
$  5 5 , 1 5 4
/
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
G a i n
M e s a ,  A r i z .
B u c h a n a n  C o ,  V a .
D i c k i n s o n  C o . ,  V a .
L u e n e n b e r g  C o . V a .
M e c k l e n b u r g C o . ,  V a .
N o r f o l k ,  V a .
P r i n c e  E d w a r d  C o . , V a .
W i s e  C o . ,  V a .
T e x a r k a n a . A r k .
T e x a r k a n a , A r k .
G i l r o y ,  C a l i f .
C o m p t o n ,  C a l i f .
C h e r r y  C r e e k ,  C o l o .
D e n v e r ,  C o l o .
E n g l e w o o d ,  C o l o .
O a k l a n d ,  C a l i f .
J a c k s o n v i l l e .  F l a .
S a v a n n a h , G a .
G a r y , I n d .
B o s t o n ,  M a s s .
G r a n d  R a p i d s ,  M i c h .
G r a n d  R a p i d s ,  M i c h .
F l i n t ,  M i c h .
P h i l a d e l p h i a ,  P a .
P r o v i d e n c e ,  R . l .
G r e e n v i l l e ,  S . C .
D a l l a s .  T e x .
D a l l a s .  T e x .
C l a s s r o o m  T e a c h e r s  A s s o c .
L e a r n i n g  R e s e a r c h  A s s o c .
L e a r n i n g  R e s e a r c h  A s s o c .
L e a r n i n g  R e s e a r c h  A s s o c .
L e a r n i n g  R e s e a r c h  A s s o c .
L e a r n i n g  R e s e a r c h  A s s o c .
L e a r n i n g  R e s e a r c h  A s s o c .
L e a r n i n g  R e s e a r c h  A s s o c .
E d u c a t i o n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  L a b s .
D o r s e t t  ( T u r n k e y  P h a s e )
W e s t i n g h o u s e  L e a r n i n g  C o r p .
R e a d i n g  F o u n d a t i o n s  o f A m e r .
D o r s e t t  E d u c a t i o n a l  S y s t e m s
D o r s e t t  E d u c a t i o n a l  S y s t e m s
D o r s e t t  E d u c a t i o n a l  S y s t e m s
E d u c a t i o n  S o l u t i o n s
L e a r n i n g  R e s e a r c h  A s s o c .
L e a r n i n g  F o u n d a t i o n s
B e h a v i o r a l  R e s e a r c h  L a b s
E d u c a t i o n a l  S o l u t i o n s
W e s t i n g h o u s e  L e a r n i n g  C o r p .
C o m b .  M o t i v .  E d u c .  S y s t e m s
E d u c a t i o n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  L a b s
B e h a v i o r a l  R e s e a r c h  L a b s
N e w  C e n t u r y
C o m b .  M o t i v .  E d u c .  S y s t e m s
T h i o k o l
N e w  C e n t u r y
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
1 s t  g r a d e  s u b .
R e a d i n g
A l l  S u b j e c t s
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
R e a d i n g
V o .  E d .  M o t i v .
R e a d i n g ,  M a t h
6 0 0
5 0 0
2 5 0
2 5 0
2 5 0
5 0 0
2 5 0
5 0 0
3 0 0
2 5 0
1 0 0
3 , 0 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
4 0 0
3 0 0
1 , 0 0 0
8 0 0
4 0 0
4 0 0
6 0 0
2 , 1 6 0
1 5 , 0 0 0
1 , 5 0 0
4 8 0
9 6 0
9 6 0
1 - 3 , 7 - 9
1 - 7
1 - 7
1 - 7
4 - 7
4 - 9
4 - 6
4 - 9
7 - 1 2
8 - 1 2
2 - 4
7
6 - 8
6 - 8
6 - 8
6 - 8
1
K - 6
K - 6
1 - 6
6 - 9
9
1 - 2 ,  7 - 8
2 - 8
6 - 9
9 - 1 2
9 - 1 2
$  3 3 , 9 7 6
$ 2 1 2 , 5 0 0
F O R
A L L
S E V E N
V A .
P R O J E C T
S I T E S
$  6 5 , 7 8 8
$
$  6 0 , 0 0 0
$ 1 2 0 , 0 0 0
$  5 0 , 0 0 0
F o r  A l l
T h r e e
$  8 0 , 0 0 0
$  7 0 , 0 0 0
$  9 7 , 0 0 0
$ 6 4 0 , 0 0 0
$ 1 2 0 , 0 0 0
$ 1 4 3 , 7 0 0
$ 1 6 4 , 0 0 0
$ 2 1 0 , 0 0 0
$ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0
$ 1 4 5 , 0 0 0
$ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0
$ 2 0 9 , 0 0 0
$ 2 5 6 , 0 0 0
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l  G a i n
1 . 7  G r a d e  L e v e l  G a i n
1 . 7  G r a d e  L e v e l  G a i n
1 . 7  G r a d e  L e v e l  G a i n
1 . 7  G r a d e  L e v e l  G a i n
1 . 7  G r a d e  L e v e l  G a i n
1 . 7  G r a d e  L e v e l  G a i n
1 . 7  G r a d e  L e v e l  G a i n
1 . 0  G r a d e  L e v e l  G a i n
1 . 3  G r a d e  L e v e l  G a i n
R e a d i n g  S p e e d  Q u i n t u p l e d
R e a d i n g  S p e e d  Q u i n t u p l e d
R e a d i n g  S p e e d  Q u i n t u p l e d
R e a d i n g  S p e e d  Q u i n t u p l e d
R e a d i n g  S p e e d  Q u i n t u p l e d
R e a d i n g  S p e e d  Q u i n t u p l e d
A b o v e  N a t ' l .  N o r m
1 , 6  G a i n
1 . 0  G a i n
1 . 0  G a i n
1 . 0  G a i n
1 . 2  G a i n
1 . 4  G a i n
of sixteen treatment configurations. New Century and Thiokol
Corporation were awarded the contracts for the project, which
had been planned and developed by the district staff. Education
Turnkey staff, and consultants.
The Virginia State Department of Education implemented its
network of projects in eighteen schools in seven districts in
October. Learning Research Associates was awarded the con-
tract for a year. One of the major purposes was to test a "total
learning system," which, if successful, would be considered for
adoption by the state board.
In Michigan, State Superintendent John Porter became one of
the first chief state school officials to take a firm stand support-
ing performance contracting. The Grand Rapids school system,
under the leadership of Dr. Norman Weinheimer, applied the
concept in using the services of three firms. An attempt was also
made to enter into contracts with the Grand Rapids Education
Association in which teachers could receive bonuses or be penal-
ized through salary reductions based on student performance.
Detroit and Chicago began planning performance support
contracts with firms and teachers. In Philadelphia, Behavioral
Research Laboratories entered into a contract to increase the
reading skills of over 15,000 students by approximately one year
or not be paid. In Gary, Ind., BRL assumed complete manage-
ment of the Banneker School, guaranteeing to raise the achieve-
ment levels of all students in all subjects to the national norm
over a four-year period. The Gary project was by far the most
threatened of all projects, decommissioned by the state at one
time and constantly faced with teacher strikes and resistance.
The major experiment with performance contracting, however,
began in April, 1970, when two Office of Economic Opportunity
officials visited Texarkana to review first-hand the project that
had introduced a "shaft of light" into their analysis of compen-
satory projects. They designed a preliminary research and eval-
uation project, which was presented to and approved by the di-
rector, Donald Rumsfield, as the basis for a broadly based
federally supported pilot project in performance contracting.
In May, Requests for Proposals were sent to over 100 firms,
and Education Turnkey was selected as the Management Support
Group. Two weeks later, over 250 school systems were contacted,
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and by June 15, eighteen were selected. Of the thirty firms sub-
mitting proposals, six were selected and matched with three
school systems each. Within one week, contracts amounting to
over $6 million were negotiated with the eighteen districts;
eighteen subcontracts with the firms were then negotiated. Test
data from all Title I schools and Title I eligible schools in each dis-
trict were analyzed for selection of experimental and control
sites. Student test data were analyzed to select the 600 most
academically deficient students in grades 1-3 and 7-9 in both
school sites. OEO selected the testing and analysis contractor,
Battelle Memorial Institute, ten days prior to the opening day of
* school in one district. In late August and September, 1970, the
largest field experiment in the history of public education was
underway.
The major objective of the OEO experiment was to deter-
mine if any of six different instructional systems used by per-
formance contractors could produce significant results in math
and reading for poor, underachieving students. A second goal
was to determine the feasibility of performance contracting as a
technique for conducting a large-scale field experiment. And, in
light of the scanty information and guidelines from the Office of
Education regarding the concept, a third pdrpose was to estab-
lish some benchmarks and standards for school officials to judge
firms' proposals in the future.
Applications
Performance contracting is a problem oriented concept, flex-
ible enough to be applied in a number of areas by a number of
potential contractors. This recognition is explored more fully in
the recent NSPRA report on performance contracting, written by
Stanley Elam and James Mecklenburger. Most school systems
and federal agencies have viewed the arrangement as a low risk,
low cost means for experimentation with various kinds of instruc-
tional systems. A few school districts view performance contract-
ing as a long-run program. Dallas, which applied it to vocational
training in 1970, is using several contractors to operate an entire
vocational training institute this year. Gary, Ind., is allowing
Behavioral Research Laboratories to provide services for a five-
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year period. A larger number of school districts are utilizing per-
formance contracting to solve political, social, and economic
problems. Among the school districts that have used or attempted
to use it to assist in school integration are Texarkana, Ark.;
Savannah, Ga.; Greensville, S.C.; and Wichita. In other cities,
where the community school concept has substantial support,
districts have proposed to utilize performance contracting as a
means to ensure "equity of results." The Dallas School District
recently made such a proposal in its desegregation plan.
An underlying reason for its use has been to rationalize col-
lective bargaining processes by establishing precedents such as
pay based upon productivity, differentiated staffing, and teacher
accountability. In districts with large teacher organizations (Hart-
ford, Grand Rapids, Dallas, Gary, Philadelphia, Seattle, and New
York City) performance contracts have precipitated or fostered
such concepts.
Since performance contracting is simple in concept, although
complex in realization, it provides an opportunity for community
involvement in the determination of performance specifications
and in the operation of projects, since many contractors utilize
locally trained community aides. One of the first major decisions
of the decentralized community controlled district #9 in New
York City was to enter into a performance contract project,
which had strong community support. In certain school districts
(for example, Dade County, Fla.) with aggressive teacher associa-
tions or faculties, administrators have used performance or in-
centive contracting as a means to delegate decision-making au-
thority to the classroom level while holding the teacher account-
able for results, thus leading to teacher self-governance.
Performance contracting is limited to areas where objectives
can be clearly defined and criteria for measurement mutually
agreed upon by teachers, parents, educators, and administrators.
As a result, over 90 percent of all contract projects in existence
or being planned are directed toward math and reading and
toward underachieving, educationally deficient students at both
elementary and secondary levels. Federal funding priorities are
also directed toward these areas.
Vocational training has been the area of secondary applica-
tion, ranging from automotive mechanics to drafting classes for
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women, largely because proficiency levels can be easily deter-
mined and cries of dehumanization, right or wrong, fall mainly
on deaf ears. A small project in Jacksonville, Fla., used perform-
ance contracting in several elementary courses, including a pro-
gram to improve the creative thinking capability of students.
IQ tests were used to measure achievement. In Grand Rapids,
Mich., performance contracting is being used for the first time to
improve the proficiency of educable mentally retarded children
in math and reading, utilizing a unique learning system. Several
firms have proposed to utilize performance contracting in music,
language training, social studies, and art.
Instruments used to measure achievement have not varied
much, and heavy reliance on standardized tests persists even
though critics have pointed out their pitfalls (for example, bas-
ing payment on individual rather than mean scores; requiring
minimum individual grade equivalent gains before any payment is
due; or "regression to the mean phenomena favoring contrac-
tors). In a number of schools, paper and pencil criterion refer-
enced performance objectives (usually proposed and developed
by the contractors) have been used to measure achievement on
which partial payment is based. In these performance specifica-
tions, the students are required to perform certain tasks at given
proficiency levels (for example, read four or five employment
ads in the newspaper without a mistake or repair a flat tire in
less than seven minutes).
Types of Contractors, Staff, Systems, and Methods
The majority of projects have been conducted by private cor-
porations, some of which have utilized teachers who remain
employed by the school district. Most of the firms have had ex-
perience with programmed instruction, teaching machines, and
contingency management. Their personnel have backgrounds in
industrial training, behavioral psychology, and the Job Corps or
other poverty programs.
The vast majority of the firms are small or medium size.
Performance contracting has not attracted the large educational
firms because their pricing arrangements on materials frequently
are not competitive, and they are reluctant to reduce mark-ups
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to become competitive. In other instances, they fear that per-
formance contracting will provide new entrants with footholds in
a market which is quaiitatively different from the traditional
audio-visual or textbook market.
Most of the contracting firms are systems management groups
that utilize commercial equipment which they feel will work best
with the particular students. In many instances, the firms de-
velop supplementary materials during the project. The instruc-
tional systems range from traditional ones to sophisticated teach-
ing machines, computers, or instructional management, prescrip-
tion, and diagnosis. Usually, student ratios are high; (one con-
tractor utilized one professional and thirty-two paraprofessionals
for 600 students instructed in math and reading). Some firms
offer material rewards, and others rely heavily on intrinsic mo-
tivation to increase student performance.
Aside from the types of learning systems used, several other
observations are significant. First, most firms seek to avoid the
traditional classroom practice in which a single teacher is the
most important source of knowledge. They try to establish a
system in which the teacher becomes the manager of a learning
and resources system, facilitating the students' search for knowl-
edge through diagnosis and prescription. Most firms feel that the
project teachers face two crippling problems: a feeling that the
target population will continue to fail and inadequate training
in how to manage an individualized, self-paced classroom with a
large number of students. Preservice training is provided by the
contractor in most sites with both attitudinal and classroom man-
agement dimensions.
Second, firms that rely heavily on automated instruction do
not want to bear the expense of a fully qualified classroom teacher,
required by local or state regulation or agreements, to perform
less complex tasks. Most firms use paraprofessionals where
available; some firms would prefer to use paraprofessionals
exclusively.
Third, most firms insist on refurbishing classrooms. Some
work is usually required to accommodate the firm's system (for
example, electrical wiring for teaching devices), but the most
significant reason to make the classroom look different and thus
break the failure syndrome associated with the usual setting. It
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also provides the freedom to use individually prescribed instruc-
tional systems. The typical redone classroom contains small
tables and chairs that can be grouped as desired. The student
does not bring instructional materials to class, but uses the pre-
scribed library of materials which is stationed around each room
and presented in various modes, including programmed texts,
cassett tape recorders, and teaching machines.
Fourth, a classroom visitor might observe activity that would
not be tolerated in a traditional classroom. More than 80 per-
cent of visiting traditional classroom teachers view such activity
as generally chaotic and nonproductive. Most students work on
their own project at their own pace; consequently, there is al-
ways a considerable individual movement and, at time, a great
deal of noise. Such classrooms are normally carpeted to reduce
the sound level.
Fifth, an observer of several contractor classrooms gets the
impression that a unique psychological reversal has occurred.
Students often refer to their teachers as a "partner to help
learn" while the teacher no longer teaches "at" students. One
can speculate that the availability of incentives for both teach-
ers and firms based upon student performance has contributed
to the emergence of potentially dangerous learner controlled in-
struction. Performance contracting does place the student in a
powerful position, which at the secondary level could be abused.
Sixth, over time it has become apparent that the operational
success of the projects, excluding achievement results, depends
in varying degrees upon the interface between the contractor
and the school. The two key personnel at each site were the
project administrator of the contractor (firm or teacher group)
and the school's project director. The firms had to weigh care-
fully the delicate choice between hiring a local person and train-
ing him in a short period of time and assigning to the project
an employee knowledgeable about the system and loyal to the
. firm. On the other hand, the school had to decide whether to
hire a person who could deal effectively with teachers and prin-
cipals or one qualified to manage a complex project requiring
tedious reporting and careful administration. The respective
choices of both the school and the firm had genuine implica-
tions for the projects.
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Fees
In 80 to 90 percent of the 1970 projects, the firms guaranteed
a minimum grade level increase per child or no payment would
be made (in the Office of Economic Opportunity experiment, the
minimum grade level gain was initially set at 1.0). In most
contracts, incentives are provided for incremental gains above
the minimum level; in others, penalties are imposed on a pro-
rated basis below a specified level of student performance.
In projects in which the participating teachers remained on
the payroll of the school but were assigned to the contractor,
the contracted fee for raising a student one grade level per
subject ranged between $45 and $70, with one exception of
about $300. Payment to contractors providing total learning sys-
tems, including locally trained personnel to operate the centers,
ranged from $81 to approximately $220 per grade level gain in
math or reading.
During 1970-71 at least two teacher's associations contracted
with their local boards of education on an incentive contract
basis whereby teachers could collectively earn several thousand
dollars. Several projects in operation during 1971-72 provided in-
centives for individual teachers and even parents based upon
student performance. In an Office of Education sponsored pro-
ject in four sites, teachers can earn up to $1,200 per class and
parents $100 per child, based upon performance above the class
expected gain. In Dade County, Fla., a project is being planned
whereby teachers may earn as much as $110 per student for
gains 100 percent above expected levels. Moreover, teachers will
also be provided $55 per student to defray operating costs and
have the option of utilizing $55 per student as risk capital to
invest in the classroom.
PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED
T,o analyze the merits of performance contracting as a catalyst
for change in education, one must view the problems and the
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barriers to innovation in a new light—a management perspective.
Education lobbyists feel the major problem is lack of funds.
Obviously, the general public does not share this belief. Bond
issue defeats rose from 40 percent in 1960 to 88 percent in 1969,
including instances where school systems were threatened with
closing. President Nixon has stated: "As we get more education
for the dollar, we will ask the Congress to supply many more
dollars for education." In short, the movement for accountability
is rooted in the public's unwillingness to continue to pour dollars
into school systems without evidence that there has been a com-
mensurate increase in performance.
* The "Gallup Survey of Public Attitudes Toward Public Schools"
(see Phi Delta Kappan, September, 1971) confirms the view that
the number one problem facing schools is finances—where should
costs be cut when local boards are forced to reduce total budgets?
John Q. Citizen does not want to increase class size (79 percent)
or cut teachers' salaries (77 percent), but does want to reduce
the number of administrators (50 percent) or the number of
counselors (32 percent), or would have schools charge rent on
all textbooks (34 percent).
A second major problem in education is the lack of effec-
tive participation by the students, parents, and community mem-
bers in school systems. Over the last decade, the community
control-decentralization movement has gained widespread sup-
port. Confronted with new pressures, most school administrators
have reacted defensively. The political acumen, management
capability, and necessary resources to meet the demands of the
community have been hard to come by.
Because of its inherent simplicity, performance contracting
allows for active parent and community involvement in policy
decision making. The student is also encouraged to participate
actively in the decision-making process. In most projects, the
outside contractor as well as many of the organization s employees
will be paid on the basis of how well the individual student
achieves, a significant psychological departure from the tradi-
tional classroom. Teachers become resource personnel assisting
the student to learn at his own rate. As a result, instruction
is not only learner centered but to a large extent, learner con-
trolled.
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A third problem in education has been increasing number of
confrontations between organized teacher groups or unions and
school administrators. The growth of unionization in education
is ironic, indeed. Education is the only industry in this country
that has experienced an increase in the labor/capital ratio since
1945. Moreover, education unions, unlike their counterparts in
other industries, have never been faced with job insecurity be-
cause of technological displacement.
Nevertheless, the costs of public education, of which over 80
percent is made up of teacher salaries, have doubled over the
last decade without concomitant increases in productivity. Com-
pounding the difficulties in the collective bargaining process,
school administrators have not attempted to negotiate on points
related to productivity, but on issues such as the rights and
responsibilities of administrators.
The negative reactions of the American Federation of Teachers
to performance contracting are significant indicators of the need
to drastically modify existing collective bargaining processes.
Many school boards view performance contracting as a vehicle
for introducing merit pay into public education, especially if
contractors are permitted to reward their employees on the basis
of student performance. At the same time, since most contractors
utilize differentiated staffing, efficient practices by school sys-
tems during turnkey phases must also follow similar staffing
patterns. However, while precedents for merit pay and differen-
tiated staffing could be set by performance contractors, forward-
looking teacher groups are attempting to set precedents for
greater decentralization of decision making and flexibility, similar
to that allowed the contractor. In short, performance contracting
is looked upon by many administrators and some teacher groups
as a means of ensuring that the collective bargaining process is
meaningful or will produce significant results.
A fourth major problem has been the federal push for de-
segregation and racial balance. As a result of court orders and
federal guidelines, the public school system has been under pres-
sure, and public and professional opinions have polarized. Two
situations seem to have emerged. First, school systems that
anticipate or have completed integration seek an educationally
effective and politically palatable approach to the new problems
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that have been created. Second, systems faced with anti-integra-
tionist militant pressure groups (both black and white) seek an
approach that will ensure equity of results regardless of the
location and type of facilities and equipment provided.
In the first situation, many white parents fear that the quality
of instruction for their children will deteriorate; minority group
parents are concerned that their children cannot compete and will
drop out. Performance contract projects in certain schools pro-
vide deficient students with accelerated learning for several
hours a day on a guaranteed performance basis. As a result,
when the students are sent into regular classes full time, they
are able to compete with their peers on an equitable basis.
In the second situation, where the movement toward desegre-
gation has run into opposition, support has been growing for the
following argument: If the primary aim of integration is to im-
prove the education achievement of minority children, then why
not provide quality education for all students? Should we be
concerned with the concept of equal education opportunities,
which in practice has not been too successful, or, instead, equity
of education results for all students? Doesn't performance con-
tracting offer an opportunity to guarantee achievement? Bol-
stered by the accountability movement in public education, the
concept of equity of results is growing and could well become
the policy of the seventies. For example, one spin-off of the
Dallas performance contract project was a plan that purports to
integrate through the use of closed circuit television, guaranteeing
equity of results for all students involved. If these results are
not attained after two years, the district will be held out of
compliance.
A fifth problem has been the failure of many students, par-
ticularly those from low and even middle income backgrounds,
to develop basic communication and computational skills. An
effort to cope with this failure was recently formalized in the
Right To Read program. New educational technologies developed
by the Department of Defense, Job Corps, and other groups have
been effective in developing basic skills in math and reading.
However, school systems were not adopting such improvements
and allowing the full potential of these learning systems to be
realized. Performance contracting has offered an opportunity for
29
total package procurement. Since the technology is available,
there is no reason why a new Bill of Rights could not be formu-
lated—the right of every student to read at grade level.
A sixth problem is the difficulty of conducting an experiment
in public schools. Aside from operational difficulties, the politics
of experimentation almost precludes failure, resulting in foregone
"successes," albeit with caveats. Several unique opportunities
emerge if performance contracting is used as a vehicle for serious
experimentation. If the contractor's program fails in terms of
student performance, the dollar costs to the school are little, if
any. In addition, because the firm's confidence will be reflected
in the level of guarantee and price, risk is reduced. However, if
the contractor does fail, the school administrators have a scape-
goat outside the system.
Moreover, the contractor has a greater degree of flexi-
bility than most schools in designing the program, using in-
novative techniques, and operating the program without the con-
straints of regulations, procedures, and custom. Hence, the op-
portunity for a high degree of innovation exists during the first
year's operation, and a high degree of leverage exists for school
administrators to make necessary changes during the turnkey
phase if the contractor's program is successful.
Seventh, and last, many have argued that the major barrier
to education reform is the incentive structure in public schools.
Few, if any, incentives reward personnel (with the possible ex-
ception of athletic coaches and band teachers) for improving
student performance or allocating resources more efficiently.
Advocates of change in education are directing greater study and
analysis to the incentive systems or lack thereof in public
education as a major explanation of an unresponsive structure.
Ted Sizer and Christopher Jencks, advocates of the voucher
program, have conceptualized public education as a monopoly
which provides little variety and choice of services for consumers.
Presidential counselor and scholar Daniel P. Moynihan has argued
the need for federal policies that utilize incentives as a means of
increasing productivity in social services including education.
Advocates of merit pay and promotion based on student per-
formance are no longer writing research papers on the subject
but are now attempting to apply the concept in schools from
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Washington, D.C., to Mesa, Ariz. New concepts of grants manage-
ment, including performance contracts, are, for the first time,
being seriously studied in the federal and state education agen-
cies for probable application and implementation.
HOW WELL DID PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING SUCCEED?
'etailed results from many projects are still unavailable (re-
suits from the twenty sites in the Office of Economic Opportunity
experiment were released in January, 1972; see Prologue). There-
fore, the following comments and indications should not be taken
as conclusive, since they are based on the limited hard data
presently available, impressions gained through observation, and
communications with both firms and school district personnel.
Is performance contracting a cost effective'system? Thus far,
however, preliminary results from scattered projects indicate
that the average rates of achievement in math and reading for un-
derachieving students were about doubled for a cost slightly more
than existing cost per student year per subject. The recent Rand
study of a limited number of projects stated that gains ranged
from 0.4 to 1.7 grade levels in nine months. Since the break-
even point for most firms was higher than the grade levels
achieved, the fees actually paid were less than the firms' costs,
making the year more profitable for the schools than for the
firms in several instances.
Most firms conducting performance contracting projects
guarantee improvement of approximately one grade level in
math or reading for a $81 to $210 fee per pupil with penalties
and bonuses based on student performance. Other firms utilizing
local personnel who remain on the payroll of the school system
provide a similar guarantee for a fee of $45 to $75. In properly
planned projects, the Request for Proposal will specify conditions
that ensure a high probability of reducing the costs per unit of
achievement during the turnkey phase. At the same time, the
school's cost and performance accounting system must be mod-
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ified in order to evaluate results and costs (for example, dropout
and repeater rates must be factored into the reporting and an-
alysis) during the turnkey phase. Therefore, depending upon the
changes the school system is willing to make, the probability of
reduced costs through greater instructional efficiencies and
optimal allocation of resources in specific program areas can
be high.
The costs of the twelve OEO performance contract projects
analyzed by Education Turnkey staff, using the COST-ED com-
puter analysis and simulation model, are revealing. First, while
many firms used similar materials, the economics of the systems
varied significantly, especially regarding staff use, equipment,
books, and audio-visual costs. For example, about 70-75 percent
of total costs in the control sites were spent on teacher pay
and books, and 1-2 percent on audio-visual materials. The con-
tractors spent 60-65 percent and 15-20 percent in the correspond-
ing areas (see Table 2).
Second, compared with control programs, contractors' invest-
ments in instructional equipment were significantly greater in
most programs. Third, if the schools adopted contractors' instruc-
tional programs, operating costs would be less than existing
school costs per student/subject in about one-third of the cases
and greater in the rest.
Fourth, achievement scores (used here only as one benchmark
for analysis) in contractors' programs will not have to be signif-
icantly greater than control program scores for contractors' pro-
grams to be more cost effective than the schools'. Assuming
that the average control site scores showed a 0.5 grade equiva-
lent gain, the contractors would have to produce the following
gains to have proportional cost effectiveness ratios: Alpha Learn-
ing, 0.53; Learning Foundations, 0.82; Plan Ed. Center, 0.67;
Quality Ed. Development, 0.63; Singer-Craflex, 0.57; and Westing-
house Learning, 0.53.
The reasons for variances and costs that were lower than
expected were noted as follows in the report to the OEO:
Lower classroom costs through better student scheduling and
utilization of facilities, space, and instructional equipment
Lower staff costs through the use of paraprofessionals to op-
erate self-paced, individualized student learning systems
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T A B L E  2
P r o g r a m  R a n k i n g s  b y  T o t a l  C o s t  p e r  S t u d e n t - Y e a r  ( N a t i o n a l  A v e r a g e  P r i c e s )
E L E M E N T A R Y  R E A D I N G
R A N K  S I T E
C O N T R O L  P R O G R A M S :
1  A t h e n s
2  L a s V e g a s
3  J a c k s o n v i l l e
4  G r a n d  R a p i d s
5  D a l l a s
6  R o c k l a n d  ( T h o m a s t o n )
7  S e a t t l e
8  S e l m e r
9  H a m m o n d
1 0  F r e s n o
1 1  T a f t ( S i n t o n )
1 2  P o r t l a n d
E X P E R I M E N T A L  P R O G R A M S :
1  S e l m e r
2  D a l l a s
3  A t h e n s
4  F r e s n o
5  S e a t t l e
6  G r a n d  R a p i d s
7  H a m m o n d
8  P o r t l a n d
9  J a c k s o n v i l l e
1 0  T a f t
O R G A N I -
Z A T I O N
D i s t r i c t
D i s t r i c t
D i s t r i c t
D i s t r i c t
D i s t r i c t
D i s t r i c t
D i s t r i c t
D i s t r i c t
D i s t r i c t
D i s t r i c t
D i s t r i c t
D i s t r i c t
P L A N
Q E D
P L A N
W L C
S / G
A l p h a
L F
S / G
L F
A l p h a
H O U R S /
D A Y
1 . 1 0 0
. 9 8 3
1 . 0 8 3
1 . 0 5 0
1 . 5 4 6
1 . 1 7 0
1 . 0 0 0
2 . 0 0 0
1 . 7 0 0
1 . 5 0 0
2 . 0 0 0
1 . 9 1 7
. 7 5 0
1 . 0 0 0
, 9 2 0
1 . 0 0 0
. 6 9 4
1 . 1 5 6
. 7 5 0
. 9 1 7
1 . 0 0 0
1 . 5 0 0
T O T A L
C O S T
P E R
S T U D E N T -
Y E A R
$ 1 5 0 . 3 2
1 7 4 . 1 0
1 7 6 . 5 3
1 8 6 . 5 7
2 1 6 . 6 3
2 2 1 . 0 1
2 5 2 . 3 5
2 5 5 . 7 6
2 7 4 . 1 5
2 8 6 . 9 5
3 0 0 . 8 5
3 4 9 . 8 0
$ 1 4 7 . 7 0
1 8 6 . 4 7
1 9 0 . 8 4
2 1 5 . 5 2
2 1 5 . 7 9
2 1 7 . 2 9
2 5 2 . 0 4
2 6 3 . 0 1
2 7 0 . 2 5
2 8 0 . 5 2
T e a c h e r
%
7 0 . 9
6 6 , 5
6 6 . 9
6 4 . 4
8 0 . 9
7 6 . 3
7 7 . 7
7 8 . 8
7 3 . 8
7 5 . 4
8 0 . 0
7 4 . 3
4 6 . 1
5 3 . 0
5 3 . 2
1 2 . 6
5 2 . 2
5 1 . 5
0
6 6 . 4
0
4 9 . 5
P a r a p r o -
f e s -
s i o n a l %
0
0
0
1 1 . 6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 5 . 4
1 9 . 0
1 9 . 7
4 1 . 7
9 . 5
1 5 . 0
5 9 . 6
0
6 6 . 1
3 2 . 0
T o t a l
S t a f f %
7 0 . 9
6 6 . 5
6 6 . 9
7 6 . 0
8 0 . 9
7 6 . 3
7 7 . 7
7 8 . 8
7 3 . 8
7 5 . 4
8 0 . 0
7 4 . 3
6 1 . 5
7 2 . 0
7 2 . 9
5 4 . 3
6 1 . 7
6 6 . 5
5 9 . 6
6 6 . 4
6 6 . 1
8 1 . 5
C l a s s -
r o o m %
2 3 . 0
2 8 . 7
2 6 . 7
1 7 . 7
1 5 . 3
1 6 . 1
1 2 , 1
1 8 . 4
2 3 . 6
1 9 . 4
1 7 . 9
1 9 . 9
1 9 . 2
1 3 . 3
1 0 . 9
1 0 . 4
8 . 4
2 0 . 3
7 . 0
1 3 . 2
7 . 9
9 . 4
I n s t r u c -
t i o n a l
E q u i p -
m e n t %
2 . 3
0 . 9
1 . 0
1 . 9
1 . 7
0 . 6
1 . 0
0 . 5
0 . 9
0 . 9
0 . 4
2 . 3
0 . 8
5 . 3
1 . 5
8 . 6
4 . 1
1 1 . 9
2 . 3
5 . 5
2 . 1
0
B o o k s
a n d
A u d i o -
v i s u a l %
1 . 1
2 . 3
0 . 9
2 . 8
0 . 8
2 . 8
3 . 8
1 . 0
0 . 7
1 . 4
0 . 6
2 . 3
1 7 . 6
6 . 1
1 4 . 7
3 . 6
2 3 . 3
0
2 4 . 9
1 3 . 3
1 7 . 6
8 . 2
O t h e r
%
2 . 7
1 . 6
4 . 5
1 . 6
1 . 3
4 . 2
5 . 4
1 . 3
1 . 0
2 . 9
1 . 1
1 . 2
0 . 9
3 . 3
0
2 3 . 1
2 . 5
1 . 3
6 . 2
1 . 6
6 . 3
0 . 9
Reliance on instructional components with relatively low
operating cost, such as teaching machines, cassettes, and non-
consumable programmed instructional packages
Better management control and greater administrative and
classroom flexibility than in traditional settings.
Before drawing hasty conclusions, school officials will not
only have to await the OEO results, but also consider the pub-
lie's present attitude towards where costs should be cut. The
general public is either emphatically certain about what consti-
tutes good education policy and contributes most to student
achievement, or is totally ignorant about the economics of school
operations and budgets. An analysis by the Education Turnkey
staff of the typical school's costs (elementary math) derived from
national averages used in the OEO study is illuminating:
Increasing the student-administrator ratio from 406/1 to 564/1
would save as much money as increasing the student-teacher
ratio from 29/1 to only 29.7/1.
The saving of renting books rather than providing them free
could be surpassed by increasing class size by one student or
by reducing the average annual pay of teachers (for example,
by hiring paraprofessionals or younger teachers) by an amount
less than 1 percent of the total budget.
A decrease in annual pay of teachers by 5 percent will free
enough resources to increase audio-visual materials and books
by 170 percent.
COST-ED analyses of these and many other equal-cost trade-
offs in performance contractor's and control school programs in-
dicate the cost saving potential of performance contracting in
specific areas. In the same Gallup poll, 49 percent of the public
favored performance contracting; however, the public's attitude
towards the cost-saving implications could constrain the adop-
tion of learning systems during the turnkey phase. If the achieve-
ment results are significant, perhaps public views will change as
certain myths and concepts are displaced.
Is performance contracting a low risk, low cost way for ad-
ministrators to experiment? Because many firms were overly
ambitious or optimistic about grade-level guarantees, the actual
fee paid by many school systems was small in relation to the
increases in student performance. One district, for example,
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paid a fee less than existing school costs per student year for a
doubling of the rate of learning. Schools also avoided risks. In
most instances, the political heat resulting from the experi-
mentation was not directed toward the school but to federal
sponsoring agents or to performance contracting firms. Similarly,
where the contractors results were not significant, the contrac-
tor, again, rather than the school, "failed."
The Virginia Department of Education in its report to the
state board on its performance contract project in seven districts
expressed dismay at the slight gains made on standardized tests
but noted: "The use of performance contracting as a method
for delivery of an instructional program cannot be deemed a
failure on the basis of results in Virginia. ... As experienced
here, performance contracting, as a means for low risk, low
cost experimentation in education innovation can be considered
successful." However, these results have been somewhat rec-
tified by analysis of the mismatch of the posttest of May, 1971,
compared to the contractor's curriculum content.
Was innovation encouraged? Performance contracting was
also designed to encourage responsible innovation by prescribing
levels of performance and cost constraints, but not the method-
ology or materials to be used by the contractor. During the first
year, the most significant innovation was the design and actual
application of total learning systems. In this respect, performance
contracting allowed the firms flexibility to systems engineer a
variety of methodologies and curricula into learning systems
tailored for the target populations.
In the first Texarkana project, Dorsett Educational Systems
unveiled the TM80, a teaching machine with an audio-discrim-
inator that permitted the student to respond verbally to pro-
grammed questions. The device could discriminate between the
responses "tree" and "three." Behavioral Research Laboratories
used for the first time, in the Gary project, its novel math
program (grades 1-8), which requires little if any reading capa-
bility. In Providence and Dallas, New Century demonstrated its
capital-intensive Skinnerian math and reading programs. LRA in
the Virginia project used extensively the Cohen reading taxon-
omy, which was recently announced by Random House. And in
a "sleeper" project in Texarkana in 1970, the James Evan touch-
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and-tell reading program for educable mentally retarded children
was demonstrated.
Few other radically innovative learning systems, hardware or
software developments, or .pedagogical approaches have sur-
faced. Perhaps the lack of developmental funds in contract pro-
ject budgets or the relatively short life of performance contract-
ing has been a significant factor. Or perhaps the realization is
dawning that classroom instructional management rather than
gadgetry might be more significant in producing results.
Is performance contracting a catalyst for reform'1 Another
primary criterion for judging performance contracting must be
its impact on school system renewal. A major conclusion of the
Rand study is that performance contracting "really does facil-
itate a radical change." Even though achievement scores are not
yet available, about a third of the schools involved in performance
contracting in 1970-71 planned to continue the projects; another
third planned to adopt on a turnkey basis the contractors' program
in part or totally; and the rest were undecided.
Norfolk, Va., expanded the turnkey phase from two schools
in 1970 to ten in 1971, while Buchanan and Wise County, also in
Virginia, have turnkeyed the LRA Project after major redesign
efforts. All three projects in Grand Rapids have been turnkeyed,
and an additional project in special education is underway. The
teachers and principals in the school involved requested that the
turnkey phases be expanded in January, 1972. A turnkey opera-
tion at the elementary level in Taft, Tex., was implemented after
school officials refined the program during the summer; the per-
formance contractor has now adopted the Taft program and is
using it in most of his major performance contracts elsewhere.
In 70 to 80 percent of the turnkey projects, local rather than
nonformula federal funds are being used. It is uncertain whether
turnkey projects were operated as effectively or efficiently as the
performance contract projects that preceded them. Only the
long-range results will tell—if school administrators are willing to
initiate management changes and independent evaluations are
preformed.
Is performance contracting dehumanizing? One of the seren-
dipities observed over the past two years has been a unique
psychological reversal in the classroom: The firm, the teachers,
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and others depend monetarily or otherwise, upon the success of
individual students. In several projects, teachers began to per-
ceive themselves as learning and resource partners. Instruction
in this sense was not only learner centered but also learner con-
trolled.
National and local teacher associations generally have opposed
performance contracting. Although the attitudes of the partici-
pating teachers toward the projects ranged from intensely negative
to extremely positive, the marjority felt that they were allowed,
within limits, flexibility to do what they had always wanted to
do. In certain sites, participating teachers became "salesmen"
for performance contracting within the school and in the im-
mediate area. Early involvement of teachers during planning is
critical to positive teacher attitudes and cooperation.
Student reaction to the project has been observed in several
areas. A "smile factor" was noticeable in many projects; at-
tendance was generally significantly higher than in control sites
(because make-up classes were available, actual attendance in
one performance contracting site was greater than the number of
regularly scheduled hours available); and dropout rates were sig-
nificantly reduced in the vast majority of sites analyzed thus far.
In one Virginia project involving 500 students; the dropout rate
of the target group fell to zero.
Did community involvement increase? The New York City
district mentioned earlier viewed the experiment as leverage not
only to countervail union pressures but also to involve commun-
ity residents as paraprofessionals and teacher aides. After the
first abortive attempts to implement the project in September,
1970, Learning Foundations, the contractor, and officials, includ-
ing Fran Tarkenton and other New York giants, held a com-
munity dinner attended by over 100 parents, many of whom
signed up as paraprofessionals. With substantial community sup-
port, the project was initiated despite strong teacher resistance,
including attempts to obtain court injunctions. In Taft, Tex.,
minority parents threatened to withdraw their children from the
project, arguing that inferior paraprofessionals were teaching and
that segregated classes were being perpetuated. As communica-
tions between school and community improved, parent resistance
subsided.
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In Dallas, where disciplinary problems threatened the con-
tractor's program, parents who had been members of the plan-
ning advisory group formed voluntary committees to patrol the
school hallways to ensure the project's continuance. And some
have credited community support for the continuation of the
Gary project in the face of strong teacher resistance. In the
majority of projects, principals reported a high level of parental
support during the entire year, even though a few parents with-
drew their children from the program during initial stages. Gen-
earlly, as indicated in the -Gallup Survey of Education, public
support for performance contracting increased from about 23 per-
cent in 1970 to 49 percent in 1971.
Did it rationalize the collective bargaining program? Without
doubt, performance contracting has provided a leverage for
school administrators trying to initiate incentive or merit pay
and differentiated staffing. One school board plans to initiate
incentive programs for all students and teachers during the turn-
key phase. Other school principals have attempted to initiate
projects with teacher incentives similar to those in the perform-
ance contract. In one project a lawsuit was filed by the teach-
ers' groups resulting in the discontinuance of incentive pay during
the last semester.
Aside from the impact of performance contracting on the
negotiating process, the nature and results of COST-ED analysis
have provided administrators with another tool leading to the
rationalization of collective negotiations. Through the equal-cost
trade-offs analysis of both control and experimental schools,
administrators in several sites are able to determine trade-offs
between teacher pay and other factors. For example, an increase
in teacher pay in the typical elementary third grade from $9,025
to $9,291.80 could be absorbed by any of the following equal-
cost trade-offs:
Increase class size from 27.3 to 1, to 27.9 to 1
Reduce classroom maintenance by 29 percent
Reduce classroom equipment costs from $18.99 to $2.59 per
student.
These trade-off reports have forced teachers and adminis-
trators to focus on costs of alternative negotiating points rather
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than waste time in the political hyperbole which too often sur-
rounds negotiations.
Was it an aid to desegregation? It is too early to judge de-
cisively, but performance contracting seems to have aided de-
segregation. The NAACP recently passed a resolution favoring
performance contracting. One contract in a southern state last
year was funded under the Emergency School Fund Act. And the
supporters of performance contracting in Texarkana soundly de-
feated freedom-of-choice advocates at school board election time;
integration there has occurred relatively smoothly. In several
sites, including Wichita and Jacksonville, court orders and de-
visions have required the closing of schools or transfer of stu-
dents; these developments have affected the validity of any
evaluation.
0,
NEW DIRECTIONS: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL
'riginally conceived as a catalyst for school system reform,
first-generation performance contracting by private firms should
put itself out of business for the most part within the next couple
of years, not because of its failure but because of its success.
While school officials will continue to use it as a low risk, low
cost vehicle for experimenting with radically new or untested
learning systems, its major contributions will have been made in
the immediate future.
Performance Support Contracts
As the results of learning systems used by contractors become
available, both contracting firms and school officials will see
the advantages of entering into turnkey projects immediately,
without going through the costly and time-consuming perform-
ance contract stages. Previously sold only materials, schools are
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now getting training and other support from firms with guar-
antees. With cost effectiveness data available for a large number
of learning systems, it is possible to simulate the cost effective-
ness of alternative programs under varying constraints to assist
officials in selecting programs or reducing the costs of recently
turnkeyed contract projects.
Performance support contracts are presently under way in
Chicago, Detroit, and Miami. In the first two districts, LRA and
Alpha II Learning Systems, respectively, are providing teacher
training, materials, equipment, and monitoring services to both
principals and teachers; the major risk is assumed by the firms
even though the teachers remain under the employment of the
districts. In Miami, Plan and Behavioral Research laboratories,
operating under similar conditions, will receive their maximum
payment if elementary students achieve 100 percent above ex-
pected gains and none for gains less than 10 percent. The major
problems anticipated in such contracts include illegal delegation
of authority to the firm regarding supervisory and firing or trans-
fer policies, and conflict with union and school regulations regard-
ing teacher working conditions and maintenance liability (for ex-
ample, if the district purchases the firm's equipment, then the
school's maintenance personnel are required to service the equip-
ment, and any downtime affects the firms costs). Even these
potential problems are less formidable than those in first-
generation performance contracts; guarantees by firms are like-
wise less extensive because of lack of management control.
Incentive Contracts with Teacher
In two of the Office of Economic Opportunity project sites, Mesa
and Stockton, the districts entered into contracts with their
teacher associations, whereby the teachers receive incentive pay-
ments based on student performance. The participating teachers
chose to pool the incentives earned during the year. In the
majority of states, such contracts would be illegal, since teacher
association charters do not specify such activity and services;
waivers were required in the OEO project.
Because of legal and political problems, most teacher incen-
tive projects have taken on a new character. The most innova-
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tive has been developed in Miami. Beginning in March, 1971,
representatives of three teacher associations, parent groups, ad-
ministrators, and students formed a Professional Advisory Com-
mittee (PAC) to assist and advise in the development of a Re-
quest for Proposal. Specifications discussed at a prebid confer-
ence included the following:
Both faculties and firms could receive up to $110 for each
student who achieved a grade level approximately 100 percent
above expected gains in math and reading as measured by stan-
dardized tests and "banks" of performance objectives.
Both would receive $55 per student to be used to defray op-
* erating costs, without the risk of having to pay back the amount.
Faculties could invest up to $55 per student of "risk capital"
for teacher training or instructional classroom equipment; how-
ever, if the students achieved less than 50 percent above ex-
pected gain, a portion, if not all, of the risk capital expendi-
tures would have to be repaid.
Technical support was provided to the interested faculties
by Turnkey staff, administrators, and representatives of the
teachers associations. Proposals submitted by teacher groups and
five private firms indicated that teachers were willing to guaran-
tee a higher level of student performance than the firms. How-
ever, the teachers demanded certain quid pro quos from the
district, such as twenty-four hour maintenance service, specific
information regarding student achievement levels and validation
results of instruments to be used, and greater classroom flexi-
bility. Moreover, the teachers proposed to use the risk capital
allocations and negotiated agreements with equipment suppliers
so that the suppliers shared the risks, as in a performance sup-
port contract. Teachers proposed to use teaching machines, stu-
dent incentives, and peer tutors in their respective programs
which began in January, 1972.
While legal and political problems of delegation exist, they
are minimal, especially in light of the participatory management
process which was followed in the creation of PAC and the de-
velopment of the RFP. Aside from establishing precedents in the
use of risk capital and new testing instruments, the project is
the most visible example of combining incentive contracting with
professional self-governance, a much discussed goal of the NEA.
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Another variation in incentive contracting with teachers is the
USOE-sponsored Project in the Use of Incentives being conducted
in San Antonio, Oakland, Jacksonville, and Cincinnati. Teachers
can earn up to $1,200 if student achievement, as measured by
standardized tests, is three to four months ahead of expected
gains. In the first two sites, incentives up to $100 per child can
be earned by parents. The major objective of this evaluation
project is to determine whether incentives offered to teachers
and parents will result in increased student performance for
poor, minority group elementary students. A second objective is
to determine what, if anything, teachers and parents will do dif-
ferently to ensure maximum student achievement.
Contracting Between State Departments and Districts
The idea of contingency funding and grant management between
funding agencies and grantees has been batted around at the
federal level since 1966, when Bureau of the Budget officials
proposed to the U.S. Office of Education that Elementary and
Secondary Education Act Title I and Title II funds be based upon
results achieved. Departments of education in several states have
discussed and considered accountability "agreements" with
locals. None, however, were implemented until November, 1971,
when Michigan initiated its $23 million accountability model,
possibly the most significant turning point in public education
during the century.
Approximately sixty-five districts have been awarded amounts
ranging from $6,000 to over $11 million to increase achieve-
ment of minority students scoring below the 15th percentile
in math and reading. The districts have been given specific
achievement levels as goals. If, after the first year, tests indi-
cate that each student achieves the specified level, the district
receives the full amount of funding the succeeding year based
on the state formula. If, on the other hand, the students achieve
less than 75 percent of the specified goals, a prorated penalty
is applied.
"Revolutionary" hardly describes the project. First, the dis-
tricts receive in essence a fixed fee per student to raise him to
a specified level or be penalized the following year—grant man-
agement at its highest level! Second, districts that are most ef-
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ficient in meeting the objectives will be rewarded, since the
amount of the fee is based upon results, not costs incurred. In
this respect, the project differs from the vast majority of federally
funded projects. For example, given a fixed fee of $200 per
student, a district could purchase a system costing only $50
per student; if it produced the necessary achievement level of
0.8 years growth, a $150 "profit" could be earned and used for
general and administrative purposes by the district. Third, each
district now has an incentive to search the market place for the
learning system which it feels will produce the necessary results
at lowest cost. Cost considerations have often been neglected
tin performance contract projects funded largely with federal
funds. One firm's fee for raising a student one grade level was
80 percent above the school's existing cost to produce similar
results. And last, it could put the districts out of the compensatory
education business as the number of eligible deficient students
decline, if the district does its job right; it could be put out of
business altogether if it does not, as state aid dries up.
Implications for performance contracting between districts
and teachers or private firms are significant. Of the $23 million,
$500,000 is specifically earmarked for contracts with private
firms; a large number of districts are entering similar perform-
ance support contracts with private groups with the $22.5 million.
In Detroit, it is estimated that several million dollars will be
allocated to performance support contracts.
As with any bold and innovative undertaking, the Michigan
project inherits some of the problems inherent in performance
contracting. First, even though officials are hopeful that criterion
referenced tests will be used, most districts will propose to use
norm referenced tests, which will require state approval. Since
individual rather than mean scores will be the basis of deter-
mining future allocations, the standard error of most norm tests
will take its toll on the districts. Second, because teachers will
administer tests and will be aware of the specific tests to be
used, the opportunity for teaching to tests exists. Allegations,
just or unjust, are certain to be made.
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0.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
'nly in education would a contract have to be called a per-
formance contract; any contract worth its salt requires some
specification of performance. Part of the concern and controversy
must be attributed to the focus of performance—the student-
and few schools are organized and managed to direct their re-
sources, if not their concern, towards student performance. A
drastic departure from the concept of "schoolkeeping," perform-
ance contracting has raised some fundamental issues. In doing
so, it impinges upon certain vested interests. Performance con-
trading has forced us to recognize that these interests possess
sensitive antennae that pick up signals which are transmitted
and converted into the milieu in which decisions are made at
both the local and national levels.
Any attempt to pinpoint the policy implications of performance
contracting must be tempered by at least two reminders. First,
because the concept encompasses so many departures from
tradition, conceptually and even operationally, it is tempting to
attribute many policy changes to its adoption and expansion.
However, differentiated staffing, individualized instruction, con-
tingenry management techniques, cost-effectiveness analysis, and
merit pay were around long before performance contractors
packaged and demonstrated them. Second, some have assumed
that federal education policies affect local decisions beyond the
enticement of federal funds. Public education consists of thou-
sands of autonomous entities, and their decisions reflect the de-
sires of local constituencies despite official guidelines. In short,
performance contracting in its first generation or hybrid stages
will prevail, not because of federal policies or support, but only
if it meets the political, social, economic, and educational criteria
of acceptance at the district level.
A New Approach to Federal Experimentation
Federal approaches to field experimentation in education will
certainly have to consider performance contracting. A proper
analysis of the Office of Economic Opportunity experiment
must separate contracting as a technique of experimentation
from that of a technique of instruction. Its low risk, low cost
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characteristic hedges against failure; its flexibility encourages in-
novation and quick start-up; and the incentive structure reduces
the costs of administration.
At the same time, it places critical significance upon goal
definition and criteria selection. Furthermore, it assumes the ex-
istence of a management capability at the local level while ex-
aggerating the conflict between rigid evaluation design and op-
erational efficiency.
A Prescriptive Role for Industry
Typically, federal policy towards industry has been proscriptive
("thou shall not"), for example, antitrust legislation. Through the
prescriptive policies of performance contracting, industry is
asked to do a job without being told how to do it, thereby en-
couraging a perpetual search for efficiency. And to the extent
that the users (school systems) demand efficiency and that market
power does not become concentrated within, a type of creative
destruction will continue as old concepts and techniques are
displaced by the new.
The major role of the federal government and even local dis-
tricts will be to ensure that it becomes profitable for firms only
if and when the firms serve the public or student's interest.
Performance contracting has and will continue to change the
qualitative nature of existing markets, introducing competition
through innovation.
Equity of Results vs Equal Educational Opportunity
Performance contracting has precipitated an argument for equity
of education results, regardless of similar opportunities. Aside
from the social goals of integration, the failure of many ap-
proaches, especially busing, to increase the achievement levels
of minority group children has led to support for programs such
as performance contracting. These guarantee results regardless
of the location of the child, the amount of resources, or class
size, and maintain the integrity of the neighborhood school.
While most guidelines of federal programs (for example, Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act Title I) require equality
in terms of comparable inputs, such as facilities or student-
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teacher ratio, performance contracting introduces the concept of
equity of results.
Management Control with Program Flexibility
From a management perspective, accountability is nothing more
than the adoption of management for results principles, whereby
the criteria for measuring the attainment of stated objectives
are determined through a participatory management process.
Program flexibility is delegated to the lowest operating unit,
the school or classroom, and those managers who are willing to
accept the responsibility for greater results are provided not
only additional resources but also incentives, material or other-
wise, for successful performance. Performance contracting epit-
omizes management control, program flexibility regarding the
approach, incentive for successful performance, and delegation
of authority. Ironically, it has established precedents for profes-
sional self-governance for teachers, encouraging teacher-
generated proposals for accountability.
The policy implications are clear: the effective application
of the fruits of educational reward and development will not oc-
cur in our public schools until a management environment con-
ducive to innovation and risk taking is created in the classroom
through the board level. At the heart of such a system is an
incentive network that encourages the attainment of school system
objectives by perpetuating phased and evolutionary creative
destruction and renewal.
The O.E.O. Evaluation Report
The release by the Office of Economic Opportunity of its own
evaluation of the 18 performance contracts it had sponsored
deserves comment because of the exaggerated importance some
persons will place on this report.
The O.E.O. report indicated that no significant gains were
made by students in the experimental group compared to the
control schools. Hence O.E.O. flunked performance contracting
and critics had a heyday.
While the preliminary results were disappointing, they were
not as discouraging as the O.E.O. report made them appear.
When probed by the press, O.E.O. officials admitted that small to
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medium sized Southern sites produced five significant successes
for every one failure. These schools, administratively more flex-
ible and less unionized than Northeastern and Western schools,
provide a clue to the settings where performance contracting is
most likely to succeed and where resistance occurred in the
project.
The O.E.O. report may be further criticized for being based
on projects that were hastily planned. The average planning
time for the 18 projects was less than half of that generally
accepted—six months for one project.
Finally, O.E.O. fails to identify performance contracting as an
experimental approach. If no results are achieved, no payment
is made. One firm did receive the maximum payment; others
received less, as expected. Moreover, one-third of the contrac-
tors programs cost less than the control programs in math and
reading. Hence, significant grade level gains were made in many
of the 18 sites at less cost.
But the greatest error of commission in the experiment and
ommission in the report was O.E.O.'s unwillingness to analyze
performance contracting as a change agent. Although strongly
recommended by Turnkey staff, the turnkey concept was not
included in the project design. Most persons who have been
intimately involved in the performance contracting movement
have consistently argued that performance contracting would
make a major contribution as a catalyst for change. In fact, the
recent Rand Corporation study of five non-O.E.O. sites concluded
that performance contracting did "facilitate radical change" in all
five schools. At least five of the 18 districts participating in the
O.E.O. experiment are continuing with their own money some of
the innovations introduced by the contractors.
We cannot underestimate the importance of this spirit of
willingness to innovate that has been nurtured by performance
contracting. This is just one of the reasons why the contracting
concept will continue, though perhaps by a different name, in
spite of the distorted reports that have been circulated about
its early successes and failures. Performance contracting is
still a three year old infant. It is much too soon to know how
strong it may grow and how much it may offer—especially when
the vital Turnkey operation is applied.
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1. SCHOOLS WITHOUT PROPERTY TAXES: HOPE OR ILLUSION? by Charles Benson
and Thomas A. Shannon
2.THE BEST KEPT SECRET OF THE PAST 5,000 YEARS: WOMEN ARE READY
FOR LEADERSHIP IN EDUCATION, by Elizabeth Koontz
3. OPEN EDUCATION: PROMISE AND PROBLEMS, by Vito Perrone
4. PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING: WHO PROFITS MOST? by Charles Blaschke
5. TOO MANY TEACHERS: FACT OR FICTION? by Herald Regier
6. HOW SCHOOLS CAN APPLY SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, by Joseph E. Hill
7. BUSING: A MORAL ISSUE, by Howard Ozmon and Sam Graver
8. DISCIPLINE OR DISASTER? by Emery Stoops and Joyce King-Stoops
9. LEARNING SYSTEMS FOR THE FUTURE, by Ron Barnes
10. WHO SHOULD GO TO COLLEGE? by Paul Woodring
11. ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS IN ACTION, by Robert C. Riordan
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13. WHAT SHOULD THE SCHOOLS TEACH? by Fred Wilhelms
All twenty titles can be purchased for $5.00 ($4.00 for paid-up members
of Phi Delta Kappa).
The seven newest titles, 14-20 are $2.00 (only $1.50 for members), i
Any six titles $2.00 (only $1.50 for members).
Discounts for bulk orders are allowed at the rate 10 to 25, 10%; 26 to 99,
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HANDLING CHARGES.
Order from: PHI DELTA KAPPA
Eighth and Union, Box 789, Bloomington, IN 47401.
